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LEGISLATION NOTE

H. 84: ADOPTED PERSONS' IDENTITY OR NATURAL
PARENTS' ANONYMITY-OHIO'S COMPROMISE TO
THE ADOPTION RECORDS CONTROVERSY
I.

INTRODUCTION

While adoption is a frequently occuring theme in the United
States, the laws governing adoption are the subject of intense debate in
the state legislatures. Much of the recent debate has focused on the
question of whether adopted persons may obtain access to their adoption records.1 Obtaining access to adoption records raises the conflict of
"4open" versus "closed" records, or more specifically, the adopted person's right to know his identity versus the natural parents' right to privacy. 2 In an effort to resolve this controversy, the current trend among
legislatures has been to enact "mutual consent registry" laws, 3 which
seek to reach a middle ground between the "open" and "closed"
records systems.4
Since 1964, the State of Ohio has maintained a "closed" or "confidential" records system. 5 Recently, however, the 115th Ohio General
Assembly passed House Bill 84 (H. 84),6 which established a "mutual
consent registry,"'7 effective March 19, 1985. This note will summarize
and explain the provisions of H. 84. The changes in Ohio law will be
examined, with special emphasis placed on the interests of the parties
to the adoption process, as well as the various types of legislation dealing with adoption records. Ultimately, this note will examine the impact of the new law on the entire adoption process, and will determine
whether the mutual consent registry established by H. 84 is an effective
1. See Pierce, Survey of State Laws and Legislation on Access to Adoption
Records- 1983, 10 FAM. L. REP. 3035 (1984).
2. See Gold-Bikin, Adoption Records Controversy, 10 FAM. L. REP. 1568, 1569 (1984).
3. See Pierce, supra note I, at 3036. For a description of mutual consent registration, see
infra notes 49-64 and accompanying text.
4. See Gold-Bikin, supra note 2, at 1569. For a description of the open and closed records
systems, see infra notes 49-60 and accompanying text.
5. See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.17 (Page 1980) (amended 1984). See also telephone
interview with Representative Jerome F. Luebbers, sponsor of Am. Sub. H.B. 84 (Sept. 5, 1985)
[hereinafter cited as Luebbers interview] (on file with the University of Dayton Law Review).
6. Act of November 20, 1984, 1984 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-643 (Baldwin) (codified in scattered sections of tits. I, 13, 21, 31, 37, and 51 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. (Page Supp. 1985)).
7. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.40 (Page Supp. 1985).
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replacement to the closed records system.
I1. BACKGROUND

A.

Interests of the Parties

The issue of access to adoption records affects the interests of several parties, including the adopted person, the natural parents, the
adoptive parents, and the state. The most obvious interest affected is
that of the adopted person. Adopted persons, or adoptees, have posed
numerous arguments for gaining access to their adoption records.
These arguments include medical reasons, inheritance rights, the psychological need to know one's identity, and arguments based on the
fundamental right to privacy, equal protection, and the "best interests
of the adoptee."
Some adoptees have argued for access to adoption records for
medical reasons. 8 This argument has been accepted by several courts
which found that needed access to family medical histories constituted
"good cause" for the disclosure of such histories. 9 Importantly, medical
histories, as well as hereditary and ethnic backgrounds, are generally
considered "nonidentifying information."'" Nonidentifying information
differs from identifying information in that such information does not
provide the adoptee with his or her birth name, the identity of his of
her natural parents, or the identity of any biological siblings. Nonidentifying information simply reveals the social and medical histories of
the adoptee's natural parents.
Adoptees have also argued that their right to inheritance is a form
of property right that justifies access to their adoption records." Although the determination of whether an estate exists against which the
adoptee may have a claim constitutes a compelling necessity for allowing access to adoption records, a court may still deny access. The
adoptee's natural parents may have some real expectation of anonymity

8. See, e.g.. In re George, 625 S.W.2d 151 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (adult adoptee petitioned
court for identifying information about biological relatives in order to find a donor for a bone
marrow transplant).
9. See, e.g.. id. at 158 (lower court erred in not making confidential inquiry of natural
father concerning his willingness to disclose critical medical facts regarding his suitability for
donation of bone marrow); In re Adoption of Spinks, 32 N.C. App. 422, 427, 232 S.E.2d 479,
482-83 (1977) (specific blood type is a medically necessary fact; the best interest of the child or
public is best served by disclosure of pertinent information contained in the adoption files); Mills
v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 317, 372 A.2d 646, 654 (1977)
(request for medical, hereditary, or ethnic background information should be granted absent compelling reasons not to reveal the information).
10. See George, 625 S.W.2d at 158. See generally Comment, Texas Adoption Laws and
Adoptees' Rights of Access to Confidential Records, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 153, 180 (1983).
II. See. e.g.. Massey v. Parker, 369 So. 2d 1310 (La. 1979).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss3/10
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based upon the sealing of the adoption records, 2 thereby precluding a
grant of access.
Another argument presented by adoptees seeking access to their
adoption records is the adoptee's so-called psychological need to know
his identity.' 3 Adoptees claim that sealed records deny them the means
to develop a sense of identity which is essential to a healthy and satisfying life."' While some courts have characterized an adoptee's severe
psychological distress as a factor that weighs strongly in favor of allowing access,1 5 no court has yet determined whether an adoptee's alleged psychological disorders alone constitute "good cause" for releasing adoption records to the adoptee.' 6
The adoptee's need to know his identity has also served as the basis for two constitutional arguments challenging the validity of confidentiality statutes.' 7 One argument is that identity formulation is a
fundamental right,'" based upon the constitutional right to privacy
enunciated in Griswold v. Connecticut' and Roe v. Wade.2 0 From

12. Id. at 1314-15 (appointment of a curator ad hoc to view the records before the adoptee
was granted access to them was necessary in light of the court's concern for the the privacy rights
of the parents). See Comment, Confidentiality of Adoption Records: An Examination, 52 TUL. L.
REV. 817, 822-24 (1978) (broad grants of inheritance rights to adoptees jeopardizes the rights
and policies underlying confidentiality statutes).
13. See, e.g.. ALMA Soc'y Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225 (2d Cir. 1979); Mills, 148 N.J.
Super. 302, 372 A.2d 646 (1977); In re Linda F.M., 52 N.Y.2d 236, 418 N.E.2d 1302, 437
N.Y.S.2d 283 (1981).
14. See, e.g., ALMA Soc'y Inc., 601 F.2d at 1229 (association of adult adoptees challenged
New York's sealed records statutes claiming serious psychological trauma and consequent pain
and suffering); Mills, 148 N.J. Super. at 302, 372 A.2d at 655 (adult adoptee's need had its
origins in the psychological makeup of the adoptee's identity, self-image, and perception of reality); Linda F.M., 52 N.Y.2d at 238, 418 N.E.2d at 1304, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 285 (adult adoptee
alleged that inability to know identity caused psychological problems which ended her marriage
and hampered her creative talents).
15. See, e.g., Mills, 148 N.J. Super. at 318-19, 372 A.2d at 655. The Mills court stated:
[The] need to know [must be] . . . far deeper than "mere curiosity." ... In order to grow
up and develop his or her own identity, the child must de-mythologize the natural parents
and see them in a realistic perspective as fallible human beings. In doing so the mature
person is able to develop his own identity and has a proper perspective on reality.
Id.
16. See Comment, supra note 12, at 847.
17. See Mills, 148 N.J. Super. at 306, 372 A.2d at 648-49; Linda F.M., 95 Misc. 2d at
589-91, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 643 (1978); In re Sage, 21 Wash. App. 803, 808, 586 P.2d 1201,
1206-07 (1978).
18. See Mills, 148 N.J. Super. at 309, 372 A.2d at 650; Linda F.M., 95 Misc. 2d at 589,
409 N.Y.S.2d at 643.
19. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Griswold, the United States Supreme Court determined that a
constitutionally protected zone of privacy was created by the penumbras emanating from the fundamental guarantees of the first, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments. Id. at 484-85.
20. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (the guarantee of personal privacy found in Griswold was
incorporated and made applicable to the individual states by the fourteenth amendment). See also
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (the right of privacy exists under the concept of
Published
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these landmark United States Supreme Court decisions, adoptees have
argued that a constitutional right to privacy, or an otherwise protected
zone of privacy, is created in the penumbras emanating from the fundamental guarantees of the first, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments, 2
which is made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. 22 Accordingly, adoptees have maintained that the right to determine one's natural identity finds its basis in one's right to privacy.23 In
addition, adoptees have based their claim of privacy upon the argument
that their status as an adoptee is part of a family relationship.24 Howrt has yet
y recognized that the adoptee
ever, based upon Roe, 25 no court
the identity of his or
right
in
ascertaining
fundamental
privacy
has a
2
her natural parents.
The second constitutional argument set forth by adoptees seeking
access to adoption records is grounded upon the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution. 7 In
states with confidential records laws, an adoptee can only gain access to
adoption records for "good cause." 2 8 Because nonadopted persons have
free access to their birth records, and adoptees are required to show
good cause in order to gain access to their records, adoptees consequently claim a denial of equal protection.2 9 However, courts have rejected this constitutional challenge, upholding the state confidentiality

liberty guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment).
21. See. e.g.. Mills, 148 N.J. Super. at 309, 372 A.2d at 650.
22. Id.
23. See. e.g., In re Roger B., 84 III. 2d 323, 327, 418 N.E.2d 751, 753 (1981). See also
ALMA Soc'y Inc., 601 F.2d at 1231 (court termed what adoptees asserted as a right to
"personhood").
24. See ALMA Soey Inc., 601 F.2d at 1231 (right to privacy exists based on the familial
relationship of adoption); Roger B., 84 III. 2d at 327, 418 N.E.2d at 753 (right to determine
identity is a privacy right that rests upon familial relationships).
25. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Court provided that constitutionally protected privacy is only
afforded to "fundamental" rights, or those "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Id. at 152.
26. See Roger B., 84 III. 2d at 327-28, 418 N.E.2d at 753 (court found that no case exists
upholding the right of an adoptee to determine his or her identity based on the argument that
such right is explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution); Mills, 148 N.J. Super. at
310, 372 A.2d at 650 (information regarding the heritage, background, or physical and psychological heredity does not fall within the zones of privacy implicitly protected in the penumbras of the
Bill of Rights).
27. See, e.g., ALMA Soc'y Inc., 601 F.2d at 1233 (appellants argued that adult adoptees
were a suspect class); Roger B., 84 Ill. 2d at 328, 418 N.E.2d at 756 (plaintiff argued that statutory provision created a suspect classification for which there was no compelling state justification); Mills, 148 N.J. Super. at 307-09, 372 A.2d at 653 (plaintiffs argued statutory classification
requiring adoptees to secure a court order to obtain birth records was suspect).
28. See, e.g., Mills, 148 N.J. Super. at 313, 372 A.2d at 652. Good cause is required to
protect the countervailing privacy rights of the natural parents. Id.
29. Id. at 310, 372 A.2d at 652. Nonadopted persons may obtain a copy of their birth
certificate upon the payment of a minimal registrar's fee. Id.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss3/10
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statutes as rationally related to the promotion of legitimate state
interests.3 0
Finally, adoptees have argued that access to adoption records furthers the "best interests of the adoptee."'' Courts have found that the
purpose of adoption is to promote the best interests of the child.3 2 Although the adoption proceeding furthers these interests by placing the
child into a caring home, adoptees argue that the focus of best interests
changes when the child reaches maturity. 3 If the best interests of the
child are furthered by placing him or her into an adoptive family,
adoptees argue that such best interests are not protected by later denying adoptees the right to identify their natural parents. When attempting to balance the interests of the relevant parties, courts have determined that the best interests of the adoptee must be weighed against
the interests of the natural parents, the adoptive parents, and the
state.34
The primary interest of natural parents in the area of access to
adoption records is that of privacy.3 5 Courts have held that natural parents have a constitutional right to privacy, emanating from the penumbras of the first, fourth, fifth and ninth amendments. 3 6 These courts
have consistently held in favor of the parents' constitutional right to
privacy by relying on the parents' right to be left alone, 7 private realm
of family life,38 freedom to choose, 3 9 and right of confidentiality.40

30. See, e.g., id. at 316, 372 A.2d at 653.
31. See. e.g., id.at 312-13, 372 A.2d at 649-50.
32. See, e.g.. id. at 307, 372 A.2d at 649. Ironically, the child has no voice in the adoption
proceeding and yet is considered the most important party. Id.
33. See Roger B., 84 I11.
2d at 333, 418 N.E.2d at 755-56; Mills, 148 N.J. Super. at
312-13, 372 A.2d at 649-50.
34. See Roger B., 84 III. 2d at 335, 418 N.E.2d at 756; Mills, 148 N.J. Super. at 316, 372
A.2d at 653.
35. See In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 763 (Mo. 1978) ("There must be finality for the
natural parents. . . . [If] there is a right to privacy, not to be lightly infringed, it would seem to
be theirs."); Mills, 148 N.J. Super. at 314, 372 A.2d at 652 (adoptees must demonstrate good
cause in order to protect the countervailing privacy rights of the natural parents).
36. See, e.g., Griswold, 318 U.S. 479 (1965).
37. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564-65 (1969); Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 478 (1928).
38. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). The Court has continued to recognize this realm of privacy and has affirmed the freedom of the family from various state intrusions. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374, 381 (1971) (state may not deny individuals' right to terminate their marriage because of inability to pay imposed court costs).
39. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53. Personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education have been recognized by the Supreme Court as being within one's right to privacy. Id.
40. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977). The Court characterized privacy as
protecting two different kinds of interests: the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters and the interest in making independent decisions. Id. See also Comment, Sealed AdopPublished
by eCommons, 1985
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Access to adoption records also affects the interest of the adoptive
parents in strengthening the bond between the adopted child and his or
her new family."' Just as the natural parents have an interest in severing their relationship with the child, the adoptive parents also have an
interest in severing the child's relationship with his or her natural par2
ents in order to stabilize the child's new environment." Most courts
have determined that the interests of the adoptive parents in raising the
adopted child in 3a secure family are best protected by confidential
adoption records.4
The state, on behalf of the child, has an interest in controlling the
access to adoption records.44 Through its police and parens patriae
power,45 the state protects the health and welfare of children who are
natural parents, 46 thereby protecting the
not able to live with their
7
"child's best interests.'
Of primary concern to the state, however, is
8
its interest in maintaining the integrity of the adoption process.4

tion Records and the Constitutional Right of Privacy of the Natural Parent, 34 RUTGERS L. REV.
451, 462-65 (1982).
41. See Mills, 148 N.J. Super. at 307-08, 372 A.2d at 649. it is important to the adoptive
parents that they be able to raise the child without fear of interference from the natural parents.
Id.
42. See id. Some adoptive parents, however, realizing the need of the child to satisfy identity conflicts, want to aid the child in searching for his or her identity. See Sorosky, Baran &
Pannor, The Reunion of Adoptees and Birth Relatives, 3 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 195, 198
(1974). Generally the reunion of adoptees with their natural parents has no permanent effect on
the adoptees' relationships with their adoptive parents. Id.
43. See, e.g., Mills, 148 N.J. Super. at 316, 372 A.2d at 653 (the best interests of all
parties to the adoption are served by a statutory shield of confidentiality).
44. Id. at 307, 372 A.2d at 649. The state has an obligation to protect the interests of the
child, a voiceless party to the adoption. Id. at 308, 372 A.2d at 649.
45. See Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV.
1156, 1198-1202 (1980). This student commentator notes:
The state's power to regulate the family derives from two distinct sources, the police
power and the parens patriae power. The police power is the state's inherent plenary power
both to prevent its citizens from harming one another and to promote all aspects of the
public welfare.
• . .The patens patriae power, by contrast, is the state's limited paternalistic power to
protect or promote the welfare of certain individuals, like young children and mental incompetents, who lack the capacity to act in their own best interests.
Id. at 1198-99 (footnotes omitted).
46. See Mills, 148 N.J. Super. at 308, 372 A.2d at 649 ("The State has an active interest
in protecting and nurturing the growing family relationship it has statutorily created.").
47. Id.
48. Id. at 316, 372 A.2d at 653. The state maintains the integrity of the adoption process by
considering the privacy rights of all the parties to the adoption proceeding. Id. As one commentator has stated: "The primary interest of the public is to preserve the integrity of the adoption
process. That is, the continued existence of adoption as a humane solution to the serious social
problem of children who are or may become unwanted, abused or neglected." Klibanoff, Genealogical Information in Adoption. The Adoptee's Quest and the Law, 11 FAM. L.Q. 185, 196
(1977).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss3/10
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Adoption Records Legislation

In response to the state's interest in maintaining the integrity of
the adoption process and protecting the health and welfare of adopted
children, the vast majority of state legislatures have enacted statutes
which protect the confidentiality of adoption information. 4 ' At present,
the majority of states still maintain "closed" or "confidential" adoption
records laws.5 0 Under confidential records statutes, adoption records
are maintained in closed files and the adoptee's access to such records
is dependent upon a court order indicating that "good cause" has been
shown. 1 One policy reason for the state's guarantee of confidentiality is
to encourage natural parents to give up a child they cannot support.5 2
Another factor supporting confidential records systems is that confidentiality strengthens the bond between the adopted child and his or her
new family.53 To a certain extent, confidentiality statutes are also supported by the state's interest in maintaining the integrity of the adoption process, and by fears that removing the assurance of anonymity
from the adoption process will increase "black market" adoptions. 54
Access to confidential adoption records is generally dependent upon the
adoptee's ability to demonstrate good cause for such access.55 The good
cause standard is subjective, providing no specific guidelines for judges
to follow in determining whether the adoptee has asserted sufficient
grounds to mandate the disclosure of confidential information. 6 In

49. See Pierce, supra note I, at 3035.
50. See id. at 3041. For an update on recent enactments, see Pierce, Illinois, Ohio, Pennsylvania Enact Laws on Access to Adoption Records, II FAM. L. REP. 1101 (1985).
51. See. e.g.. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.17 (Page 1980) (amended 1984). See also
infra notes 55 & 76.
52. See Mills, 148 N.J. Super. at 306-07, 372 A.2d at 649.
53. Id. at 307-09, 372 A.2d at 649 ("The State has an active interest in protecting and
nurturing the growing family relationship it has statutorily created.").
54. Lajoie, Access to Birth Records: An Adult Adoptee's Psychological Need and Constitutional Right, 21 N.H.B.J. 103, 109-10 (1980) (absence of confidentiality would deter both the
natural mother and prospective adoptive parents from the adoption process).
55. See Mills, 148 N.J. Super. at 313, 372 A.2d at 652. Good cause must be demonstrated
in order to protect the countervailing privacy rights of the natural parents. Id. In regard to the
necessary showing of good cause to obtain access, one relevant statute provides:
Any necessary information in the files or the record of an adoption proceeding may be
disclosed, to the party requiring it, upon a written motion in the cause before the clerk of
original jurisdiction who may issue an order to open the record. Such order must be reviewed by a judge of the superior court and if, in the opinion of said judge, it be to the best
interest of the child or of the public to have such information disclosed, he may approve the
order to open the record.
N.C GEN. STAr. § 48-26(a) (1984).
56. See Massey, 369 So. 2d at 1314 (right to inherit from both natural parents may constitute good cause); In re Gilbert, 563 S.W.2d 768, 770 (Mo. 1978) (religious beliefs may constitute
good cause); Mills, 148 N.J. Super. at 318-21, 372 A.2d at 655-56 (well-documented emotional
or psychological disturbances may constitute good cause, and requests for medical, ethnic, or hePublished
by eCommons, 1985
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making its determination, the court's function is to weigh the adoptee's
reasons for wanting to examine his or her birth records against the interests of the other parties to the adoption-the natural parents, the
adoptive parents, and the state."
Contrary to the majority of states which have confidential records
statutes, a few states have enacted "open records" laws." An open
records statute allows the adoptee access to original birth records when
the adoptee reaches legal age." In addition, under an open records
statute, the adoptee does not have to demonstrate good cause.6 °
While confidential records and open records statutes represent two
extreme positions taken by the state legislatures, the current trend
among legislatures is to seek a middle ground between the two.6 1 This
middle ground has been introduced in several states as either "mutual
consent registry" 2 or "search and consent" 63 legislation. Such new approaches seek to avoid both the stringent rules of confidential records
and the rather freely drafted guidelines governing open records.
The current trend toward a middle ground in adoption records legislation, as well as the recent discussion in the state legislatures on the
issue of access to adoption records, came about as a result of two forces
which emerged in the mid-1970's. The more obvious of the two was the
"search movement," a small number of highly visible individuals who
had written first person accounts of their experiences with adoption.6 4

reditary background should be granted, absent showing of compelling reason not to disclose). But
see Mills, 148 N.J. Super. at 318, 372 A.2d at 655 (adoptee must show that need is more than
"mere curiosity"); Linda F.M., 52 N.Y.2d at 240, 418 N.E.2d at 1304, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 285
("[Mlere desire to learn the identity of one's natural parents cannot alone constitute good
cause.").
57. See Mills, 148 N.J. Super. at 316, 372 A.2d at 653.
58. See Pierce, supra note 50, at 3036. One representative open records statute provides:
The petition and all orders in adoption proceedings shall be recorded in a book kept
for that purpose and properly indexed. Such book shall be a part of the permanent records
of the probate court in which such proceedings are had and all reports and affidavits shall
be properly filed. The files and records of the probate court in adoption proceedings shall
not be open to inspection or copy by persons other than the parties in interest and their
attorneys and representatives of the state department of pensions and security, except upon
an order of the court expressly permitting the same.
ALA. CODE § 26-10-5(a) (Supp. 1985) (emphasis added).
59. Hanley, A Reasonable Approach to the Adoptee's Sealed Records Dilemma, 2 OHIo
N.U.L. REV. 542, 543 (1974).
60. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-10-5(a) (Supp. 1985).
61. See Pierce, supra note 1, at 3036.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 3035. As noted by one observer,
One group, Adoptees Liberty Movement Association (ALMA), sought to achieve its
goals by addressing the courts and challenging the constitutionality of confidential adoption
records. The other groups, most notably, the Concerned United Birthparents (CUB),
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss3/10
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The other movement was set in the field of social work and consisted of
providing information to adopted adults about the backgrounds of biological parents, as well as arranging meetings between biological parents and adoptees who indicated a mutual desire to meet one another. 5
Mutual consent registry legislation arose primarily as a result of
the advocacy of the search movement.66 These statutory schemes allow
the natural parents to establish a registry or file of releases which enable the adoptee to gain access to his or her adoption records.6 7 Such a
registry is based on the mutual consent of both the natural parents and
the adoptee. Since 1980, most of the legislative change in the area of
access to adoption records has been toward promulgating mutual consent registry statutes.68 Today, eleven states have mutual consent registry laws. 69
In an effort to encourage additional states to open adoption
records, the search movement was also influential in creating a fourth
statutory scheme by focusing on a group entitled "WARM." 7 0
Originating in the State of Washington by the Washington Adoptees
Rights Movement (WARM), the WARM approach involves a search
organization, appointed as an arm of the court, to search for and obtain
consent from the natural parents.7 1 WARM personnel help alleviate
administrative and court costs by their volunteer efforts. For example,
volunteers "serve as an arm of the court, obtain access to confidential
adoption records, conduct searches, contact people once they have been
found, and generally act as the liaison between all parties. 7 2 The
WARM approach has resulted in enactment of search and consent legsought redress through the legislatures. By 1980, an umbrella group, the American Adoption Congress (AAC), had been formed to coordinate the efforts of most of those interested
in search and in legislative changes which would provide access to identifying information
that would lead to a meeting with blood relatives.
Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 3036. Bills were introduced to set up mechanisms for waivers of privacy, whereby
natural parents could be contacted in the event that an adoptee wished to meet them. Id.
67. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 230.6 (West Supp. 1986). The California statute provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if an adult adoptee, his or her natural
parent, and any living adoptive parent have each filed a written waiver of his or her rights
with respect to the confidentiality of adoption records with the State Department of Social
Services or any licensed adoption agency, the department or the licensed agency may arrange for contact among those persons. Neither the department nor a licensed adoption
agency shall solicit, directly or indirectly, the execution of such a waiver.
Id.
68. See Pierce, supra note I, at 3036.
69. In addition to Ohio, the other ten states are California, Colorado, Florida, Louisiana,
Maine, Michigan, Nevada, New York, Oregon, and Texas. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
Id.
Published72.by eCommons,
1985
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islation in a small number of states.73
C.

History of Ohio Legislation

74
Prior to 1963, Ohio maintained an open records policy, whereby
adopted children had complete access to their adoption records. In
1963, however, Ohio enacted closed records legislation, thereby making
adoption records confidential and accessible to adoptees only upon a
showing of good cause. 75 Effective March 19, 1985, the State of Ohio
became one of the growing number of states 7' seeking a statutory compromise to the adoption records controversy. Ohio's enactment of
confidential records and establishes a mutual
House Bill 8477 abolishes
78
registry.
consent

III.
A.

SUMMARY AND EXPLANATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF

H. 84

An Overview of H. 84

House Bill 84 (H. 84) 79 makes three significant changes in the
area of access to adoption records: release of identifying information,
release of social and medical histories, and the reinstatement of open
records access to the adoption records of pre-1964 adoptees. New section 3107.39(H) 80 provides a comprehensive definition for "identifying
information," stating that information which is "likely to assist an
adopted person in identifying his name by birth or one or both of his
biological parents" is identifying information. 81 The old law did not
73. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.49 (West Supp. 1986). See also Pierce, supra note
50 (update on recent legislation).
74. See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.14 (1960) (amended 1963).
75. Act of June 24, 1963, 1963 Ohio Laws 1647 (codified as amended at §§ 3107.11,
3107.17, 3705.03, 3705.05, 3705.11, 3705.15, 3705.16, and 3705.18 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. (Page
1980) (amended 1984)). Ohio's closed records statute provided:
The petition, the interlocutory order, the final decree of adoption, and other adoption
proceedings shall be recorded in a book kept for such purposes and separately indexed. The
book shall be a part of the records of the probate court, and all consents, affidavits, and
other papers shall be properly filed. Such papers, records, and books shall be available for
inspection only upon the consent of the court.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.17(C) (Page 1980) (amended 1984).
76. See generally Pierce, supra note 50.
77. Act of November 20, 1984, 1984 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-643 (Baldwin) (codified in scattered sections of tits. I, 13, 21, 31, 37, and 51 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. (Page Supp. 1985)).
78. Although H. 84 does not specifically state that Ohio has adopted a "mutual consent
registry," the newly enacted provisions are comparable to the typical mutual consent registry
scheme. Compare supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text (defining standard mutual consent
registry provisions) with infra notes 80-96 and accompanying text (delineating newly enacted
Ohio provisions). See also Luebbers interview, supra note 5.
79. Act of November 20, 1984, 1984 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-643 (Baldwin) (codified in scattered sections of tits. I, 13, 21, 31, 37, and 51 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. (Page Supp. 1985)).
80. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.39(H) (Page Supp. 1985).
81. Id. § 3107.39(H)(1). For example, the adoptee's original birth certificate will generally
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss3/10
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mention identifying information; it merely described such information
as "papers, records, and books."" a In addition to defining identifying
information, H. 84 establishes a scheme for obtaining access to such
information, known as the "mutual consent registry." Newly enacted
section 3107.4083 of the Ohio Revised Code requires the department of
human services to establish procedures by which agencies can inform
biological parents, as well as biological siblings, of their right to authorize the release of identifying information to the adopted child. 84
Moreover, under section 3107.41,15 any person who is twenty-one years
of age or older and who believes he or she is an adopted person, may
file a petition with the appropriate probate court for the release of information regarding his or her biological parents and biological siblings. 86 The actual filing of the release by the biological parent, coupled
with the adoptee's filing of the petition, constitutes the mutual consent
87
registry.
In the area of social and medical histories of biological parents, H.
84 modifies the existing provisions8 8 governing access to such histories.
Under the new Ohio law, an adopted person or his adoptive parents are
entitled to inspect the social and medical histories of biological parents
upon making a request to the clerk of courts. 89 Furthermore, following
the completion and filing of an appropriate request form, an adopted
person or his adoptive parents must be notified of any correction or
expansion of either the social or medical history of the biological parents.90 Finally, H. 84 expands the descriptions required of social and
medical histories. 9 ' A "social history" must describe and identify not
only cultural and ethnic background, but also race, religion, marital
status, physical characteristics, education, talent, hobbies, and work experience of the biological parents. 92 A "medical history" has to identify

contain identifying information (i.e. the adoptee's birth name and the name(s) of the biological
parents). See id. § 3107.39(H)(1)(a).
82. Id. § 3107.17(C) (Page 1980) (amended 1984).
83. Id. § 3107.40 (Page Supp. 1985).
84. Id. § 3107.40(A)(1).
85. Id.
86. Id.§ 3107.41(A)(1).
87. See id. §§ 3107.40(A), .41(A)(1). The mutual consent registry similarly allows biological siblings to authorize the release of identifying information. See id. 3107.40(A)(3).
88. See id. § 3107.17(D) (Page 1980) (amended 1984). Under the old law, the court was
permitted to determine the manner in which the information on the form was made available to
the adopted person and could make all or part of the information available to the adopted person
through the adoption agency. Id.
89. Id. § 3107.17(D) (Page Supp. 1985).
90. Id.§ 3107.17(E)(1).
91. See id. § 3107.12(C)(3), (D)(3).
92. Id. § 3107.12(D)(3).
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not only major diseases and malformations, but also allergies, ear or
eye defects, and major conditions as well as major health problems of
the biological parents that are or may be congenital or familial."
The third change created by H. 84 affects the accessibility of
adoption records of pre-196 4 adoptees. Prior to 1963, Ohio maintained
an open records policy. 94 Adoption records were filed with the knowledge and belief that such records would be accessible to the adoptees.
95
With the enactment of confidential records legislation in 1963, however, pre-1964 adoptees were denied access to their adoption records, as
such records became confidential on January 1, 1964. H. 84 restores
the open records status of adoption records filed before 1964.11 Therefore, pre-1964 adoptees may now gain access to their records as if they
were open records.
B.

The Mechanics of H. 84

Before the enactment of H. 84, adoption records were confidential
and adopted children could not obtain access to adoption records without a showing of good cause.9" H. 84 establishes a new mechanism for
the release of identifying information to an adopted person that will
likely assist the person in identifying his or her name by birth, the identity of one or both of his or her biological parents, and the identity of
98
any of his or her biological siblings. This mechanism is the mutual
consent registry.
The mutual consent registry system in Ohio requires the department of health to establish and maintain a "file of releases" pertaining
to biological parents and siblings.9 9 The department must also prescribe
a form that would permit any biological parent to authorize the release
00 In addition, the
of identifying information to his or her offspring.'
department of health must prescribe the procedure by which adoption
agencies shall inform biological parents of their right to file a form
10 1
authorizing the release of identifying information to their offspring.
A biological parent or sibling who wants a copy of the applicable

93. Id. These histories may include other social and medical information relative to the
biological parents, such as information relative to the minor's other ancestors. Id.
94. Luebbers interview, supra note 5.
95. Act of June 24, 1963, 1963 Ohio Laws 1647 (codified as amended at §§ 3107.11,
3107.17, 3705.03, 3705.05, 3705.11, 3705.15, 3705.16, and 3705.18 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. (Page
1980) (amended 1984)).
96. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3705.18(C) (Page Supp. 1985).
97. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
98. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3107.40(A)(1), .41(A)(1) (Page Supp. 1985).
99. Id. § 3107.40(C).
100. Id. § 3107.40(A)(3).
101. Id. § 3107.40(A)(1).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss3/10

19861

LEGISLATION NOTE

release form and its instructions is able to obtain them from the department of health, an adoption agency, or a probate court.1"2 Biological
parents or siblings who wish to authorize the release of identifying information must file the applicable release form with the department of
health. 0 ' The release must contain at least the name of the biological
parent or sibling filing the release," 4 the offspring's name and birthdate
as set forth in the original birth certificate,' 05 a statement authorizing
the release of identifying information, 0 6 the signature of the biological
parent or sibling, 10 7 his or her mailing address, 10 8 and the date when
the release was filed.' 0 9 The information contained in the release form
filed by one biological parent cannot include information pertaining to
the other biological parent or any biological sibling of the adoptee."
Similarly, information in the release form filed by a biological sibling
cannot include information pertaining to either biological parent or any
other biological sibling."'
If a biological parent or sibling presents a release form to the department of health for purposes of inclusion in the release file, the department must accept the release form and file it." 2 The department
must also maintain an alphabetical index to the file of releases that lists
each offspring and each adopted sibling for whom a release form has
been filed." 3 In addition, the department must maintain a separate,
alphabetical index to the file that lists each biological parent and each
biological sibling who presents a release.""
H. 84 also provides that after filing a release, a biological parent
or sibling may withdraw his release by filing a "withdrawal of release"
with the department. 1 5 Similar to the initial release form, a withdrawal of release form requires the same information that the biological parent set forth in the initial release form,"' along with a statement
withdrawing the authorization to release identifying information," the

102. Id. § 3107.40(B)(I).
103. Id. § 3107.40(B)(2).
104. Id. § 3107.40(B)(3)(a)(i), (b)(i).
105. Id. § 3107.40(B)(3)(a)(ii), (b)(ii).
106. Id. § 3107.40(B)(3)(a)(iii), (b)(iii).
107. Id. § 3107.40(B)(3)(a)(iv), (b)(iv).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. § 3107.40(B)(4)(a).
I1.
Id. § 3107.40(B)(4)(b).
112. Id. § 3107.40(C).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. § 3107.40(D)(2).
116. Id. § 3107.40(D)(3)(a).
117.
Id. § 3107.40(D)(3)(b).
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9
signature of the biological parent,' 1 8 his or her mailing address," and
the date when the withdrawal of release was filed. 2 The department
must accept the withdrawal of release form and place it in the file attached to the previously filed release. 2 '
While the authorization of release by the biological parents or siblings is a precondition to release of identifying information, such information cannot be released until the adopted person petitions for release.' 2 2 H. 84 permits any person who is twenty-one years of age or
older and who believes he or she is an adopted person to file a petition
for the release of information pertaining to his or her birth name and
the identity of his or her biological parents and siblings in a probate
court.' 23 The petition must be accompanied by the fee which the probate court has fixed for such proceedings. 1 24 When such a petition is
filed and the appropriate fee paid, the probate judge must appoint an
agency to present a certified copy of the court's order to the department of health. 25 The probate judge must then issue an order to the
the agency with a copy of
department of health requiring it to provide
26
certificate.
birth
original
the petitioner's
Upon receipt of the original birth certificate of the petitioner, the
agency must then inspect the certificate to determine whether the petiIf the agency determines that the petitioner is an adopted person.
tioner is not an adopted person, it must report this determination to the
probate court. 28 Alternatively, if the agency determines that the petitioner is an adopted person, the agency must contact the department of
health and request it to determine whether the file of releases contains
any authorizations for the release of identifying information pertaining
to the petitioner. 2 9 The department of health, in turn, must search its
files and report back to the agency whether any releases have been

118. Id. § 3107.40(D)(3)(c).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. § 3107.40(D)(4).
122. See id. § 3107.41.
123. Id. § 3107.41(A)(I). If the petitioner is an Ohio resident, he or she could file the
petition in the probate court of his or her county of residence or the probate court that entered the
final decree of adoption. Id. § 3107.41(A)(I)(a). If the petitioner is not an Ohio resident, the
appropriate court would be the probate court that entered the person's final decree of adoption or,
if that court is unknown, any probate court. Id.§ 3107.41(A)(I)(b).
124. Id. § 2101.16(D) ("The probate court shall, by rule, establish a reasonable fee, not to
exceed fifty dollars, for the filing of a petition for the release of [identifying] information regard").
ing an adopted person ....
125. Id.§ 3107.41(B)(I)(a), (2)(a).
126. Id. § 3107.41(B)(l)(b).
127. Id. § 3107.41(B)(2)(b).
128. id.
129. Id.
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filed."3 ' The agency then reports the results of its investigation to the
court."' 1 The probate court reviews the agency's report, and, where ap132
propriate, approves the adopted person's petition.
The probate judge will enter an order dismissing the petition in the
event that the petitioner is not an adopted person, or if the department
of health is not in possession of the original birth certificate.1 33 Similarly, the probate judge will inform the petitioner that identifying information cannot be released if the file of releases does not contain a release form filed by one or both of the petitioner's biological parents or
any biological siblings, regardless of whether petitioner is an adopted
person. 1 3 ' However, if the petitioner is an adopted person, and one or
both of his or her biological parents are deceased, the probate judge
shall either inform the petitioner that he or she is an adopted person,
inform the petitioner that one or both of his biological parents is or are
deceased (if such information does not "identify" either biological parent), or inform the petitioner that upon the subsequent filing of a release by, or in the event of the death of the surviving biological parent,
the petition will be acted on within thirty days.' 35 In the event that all
biological parents indicated on the petitioner's original birth certificate
are deceased, the probate judge shall enter an order granting the petition in relation to each deceased biological parent. 3 '
Where the agency determines that the petitioner is an adopted
person and the department of health provides the agency with a copy of
each release authorizing the release of identifying information to the
petitioner, the probate judge must do the following: enter an order
granting the petition in relation to each biological parent who filed a
release, inform the petitioner that he or she is an adopted person, and
require the agency to release the information to the adoptee.' 3 7 Moreover, any agency required by the probate judge to release such information must include information pertaining to any biological parent of
the petitioner who is deceased according to the probate court's or
agency's records. 38
Finally, H. 84 creates criminal penalties for unauthorized releases

130. Id.
131. See id. § 3107.41(B), (C).
132. See id. § 3107.41(C)(1)-(4).
133. Id. § 3107.41(C)(1).
134. Id. § 3107.41(C)(2). Such information may be released "upon the subsequent filing of
a release by or the death of either of his biological parents, or the subsequent filing of a release by
any of his biological siblings ....
" Id.
135. Id. § 3107.41(C)(3)(a)-(d).
136. Id. § 3107.41(C)(3)(e).
137. Id. § 3107.41(C)(4)(a)-(d).
138.eCommons,
Id. § 3107.41(D)(2)(a).
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of information, although it also provides both criminal and civil immunities for employees or officers of the department of health or the various agencies.' 3 9 Under the new law, unauthorized releases of identifying information are classified as minor misdemeanors.' 4 0 However, no
agency, officer, or employee is criminally liable for the release of such
information if a good faith effort was made to comply with the statute.14 1 Moreover, no agency, officer, or employee is liable for damages
in a civil action for injury, death, or loss resulting from the release of
if a good faith effort to comply with the statute was
the information,
2
made.1

IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

Mutual Consent v. Confidentiality

Newly enacted sections 3107.39 through 3107.44 of the Ohio Revised Code, which establish the mutual consent registry, are an addition to the pre-existing statutory scheme in Ohio dealing with access to
adoption records. The former requirement that such records be available for inspection only upon the consent of the court, under section
3107.17(C), is now deleted.' 4 3 More importantly, adopted children no
longer need to show good cause in Ohio to gain access to adoption
records as was required under the prior confidential records statute. 4 4
Under House Bill 84 (H. 84),""1 the new standard for determining
whether to allow the adopted person access to his or her adoption
records is mutual consent. 4 6 If one or both of the biological parents or
any biological sibling consents to the release of identifying information,
the adopted person may gain access to the adoption records.

139. See id. §§ 3107.43, .44. The provision prohibiting the unauthorized release of identifying information provides:
No employee or officer of the department of health shall knowingly reveal whether any
release or withdrawal of release is included in the file of releases, knowingly provide a copy
of any release or withdrawal of release in the files of releases, or knowingly reveal any
information contained in any release or withdrawal of release in the file of releases, to any
person unless authorized to do so by sections 3107.39 to 3107.44 of the Revised Code.
Id. § 3107.43(A).
140. Id. § 3107.43(C).
141. Id. § 3107.44. Immunity from civil and criminal actions is premised on the agency,
officer, or employee complying in good faith with § 3107.41(D) in the release of identifying information. Id.
142. Id.
143. See OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.17(C) (Page 1980 & Supp. 1985).
144. See id.
145. Act of November 20, 1984, 1984 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-643 (Baldwin) (codified in scattered sections of tits. I, 13, 21, 31, 37, and 51 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. (Page Supp. 1985)).
146. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.40-41 (Page Supp. 1985). See also supra notes
80-87 and accompanying text.
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The substitution of mutual consent for the good cause standard in
Ohio and a growing number of other states is evidence that mutual
consent is the soundest approach to the issue of access to adoption
records. 147 The success of mutual consent registry legislation is largely
attributable to the refutation of many of the arguments in favor of confidential records, namely, protection of the natural mother and encouraging adoption over abortion.
Confidential records may protect the natural mother by assuring
her anonymity. Today, however, with premarital sex the norm, rather
than the exception," 8 there is much less stigma associated with giving
birth out of wedlock. With a seventeen percent out of wedlock birth
rate,"1 9 unwed mothers are far more common today and may be less
concerned about privacy than twenty years ago.
It has also been argued that confidential records may encourage
adoption over abortion by assuring anonymity. 16 0 There is no evidence,
however, of a causal connection between the increase in the number of
abortions nationwide and the decrease in the number of children available for adoption.' 6 ' Notwithstanding the lack of a causal connection,
mutual consent registry laws also encourage pregnant women to choose
adoption over abortion. The natural mother is protected by such laws
because she may consent to the release of identifying information, or
simply refuse to do so. This assures the natural mother of anonymity,
while at the same time allowing her the flexibility to decide at a later
date whether to establish contact with the child.
Creation of a mutual consent registry may be the best solution to
the adoption records controversy, as evidenced by its success in the
state legislatures, 5 ' and the refutation of the arguments traditionally
made in support of confidential records legislation. However, the underlying concern of any adoption records law is the effect of such law upon
the interests of the various parties to the adoption process. The ideal
statutory scheme must consider all of these interests. In determining
whether good cause exists for permitting access to the adoption records,
confidential records statutes clearly consider the interests of all parties
by requiring courts to balance the adopted person's reasons for wanting
to see his or her birth records against the interests of the other parties

147. Pierce, supra note I, at 3036. For a listing of other states that have adopted mutual
consent statutes, see supra note 69.
148. See Gold-Bikin, supra note 2, at 1569.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
See supra note1985
69.
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to the adoption. 53 Therefore, it is necessary to determine whether mutual consent registry laws consider and protect the interests of all the
parties-allowing the adopted person access to both identifying information (to resolve identity conflicts) and nonidentifying information (to
promote health and well-being), protecting the natural parents' constitutional right to privacy, strengthening the bond between the adopted
person and his or her new family, and maintaining the state's interest
in the overall integrity of the adoption process.
B.

Interests Affected by H. 84

The ideal statutory scheme is one which protects the interests of
all the parties to the adoption process. Such a scheme may be unattainable, however, because many of the interests are conflicting. One example of conflicting interests is the adopted person's interest in knowing
his or her identity versus the adoptive parents' interest in maintaining a
stable environment for the adopted person. Another example, and perhaps the most conflicting, is the adopted person's interest in knowing
his or her identity versus the natural parents' constitutional right to
privacy. 15 '
While H. 84 does grant the adopted person wide access to nonidentifying information, 155 the release of identifying information is de1 5 Therependent- upon--the natural parents' authorization to release.
fore, the Ohio Legislature apparently found that the natural parents'
constitutional right to privacy outweighed the adopted person's right to
know his or her identity, as the adoptee's ability to receive identifying
57
information is dependent on the natural parents' consent.' H. 84 does
afford some benefit to the interest of adopted persons in seeking identifying information. As mutual consent has been substituted for good
cause, the mutual consent registry eliminates the need for adopted persons to raise constitutional arguments based on the fundamental right
58
to privacy and equal protection in order to acquire information. Similarly, the adopted person need not demonstrate good cause, based on
60 or the psychologieither medical reasons, 159 the right to inheritance,

153. See In re Roger B., 84 III. 2d 323, 327, 418 N.E.2d 751, 756 (1981); Mills v. Atlantic
City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 316, 372 A.2d 646, 652 (1977).
154. See Gold-Bikin, supra note 2, at 1569.
155. See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.17(D) (Page Supp. 1985). See also supra notes
89-93 and accompanying text.
156. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.40(A)(1) (Page Supp. 1985).
157. Id.
158. See supra notes 17-30 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
160. See Massey v. Parker, 369 So. 2d 1310 (La. 1979). See also supra notes I 1-12 and
accompanying text.
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cal need to know his or her identity.''1
On the other hand, the substitution of mutual consent for good
cause may place the adopted person at a disadvantage. Although no
court has ever recognized a fundamental right to privacy in ascertaining the identity of natural parents or an equal protection claim against
a confidential records statute, 6" courts have found good cause based
upon medical reasons,1 3 the right to inheritance, '6 4 and severe psychological distress. " Under the new mutual consent statute, adopted persons may apparently no longer rely on these former good cause reasons
to obtain their adoption records.1 66
H. 84 clearly protects the natural parents' constitutional right to
privacy as the law requires natural parents to consent to the authorization of the release of identifying information.1 6 7 The mutual consent
registry also protects the natural parents' new family by respecting
their right to be left alone. 68 Moreover, the new Ohio law encourages
the natural mother to bear a child to term, by allowing her to decide at
a later date whether she desires to authorize a release of identifying
information." 9 Finally, H. 84 protects the natural parents' right to
withhold private information, by prohibiting a release until the parents
17 0
have consented.
Whether the interest of the adoptive parents in maintaining a
strong bond between the adoptee and his or her adoptive family 1 ' is
protected by the mutual consent registry depends on whether the adoptive parents are in agreement with the adoptee regarding the need to
find out the identity of his or her natural parents. If the adoptive parents are unwilling to allow the identity of the natural parents to be
made known to the adoptee, their interest in stabilizing the adoptee's
new surroundings may be placed in danger because all that is required

161. See Mills, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 372 A.2d 646 (1977).
162. See. e.g., id. at 310, 316, 372 A.2d at 650, 653.
163. See e.g., In re George, 625 S.W.2d 151, 158 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Mills, 148 N.J.
Super. at 317, 372 A.2d at 654; In re Adoption of Spinks, 32 N.C. App. 422, 427, 232 S.E.2d
479, 482 (1977).
164. See, e.g., Massey, 369 So. 2d at 1314-15.
165. See, e.g., Mills, 148 N.J. Super. at 318-19, 372 A.2d at 655.
166. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.40(A) (Page Supp. 1985) (the new law focuses
upon the mutual consent of the adopted person and the natural parents).
167. See id. For a discussion on natural parents' privacy rights, see supra notes 35-40 and
accompanying text.
168. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
169. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.40 (Page Supp. 1985) (authority to initiate a release file is vested in the natural parents).
170. See id. (the mutual consent registry first requires the consent of the natural parent(s)).
171. See Mills, 148 N.J. Super. at 307-09, 372 A.2d at 649 (adoptive parents desire to
raise child without interference from natural parents).
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for the release of such identifying information is the mutual consent of
both the natural parents and the adoptee. Thus, adoptive parents are a
voiceless party under mutual consent legislation. Therefore, whether H.
84 furthers the interest of the adoptive parents depends upon whether
the adoptive parents attempt to aid the adoptee's resolution of identity
conflicts, 172 or seek to sever the adoptee's relationship with his or her
natural parents in an effort to stabilize the adoptee's new
1 73
surroundings.
H. 84 may also protect the interest of the state 17 4 in maintaining
the integrity of the adoption process. Mutual consent encourages the
natural parents to give up a child they cannot support by giving natural
parents the right to deny or authorize the release of identifying information.175 Also, because the new law gives the natural parents the ultimate power to release identifying information, the new law may make
it easier for the natural parents to decide against abortion, as well as
decrease the possibility of a black market adoption.' 76 Through the
adoption process, the state attempts to provide for the best interests of
the child.' 77 However, much of the recent controversy addressed in the
state legislatures concerning adoption focuses on the question of
whether specific statutes dealing with access to adoption records actually further this goal. Adopted persons argue that the focus of best
interests changes when the child reaches maturity. 178 At the point of
maturity, 79 adoptees contend that they have a specific interest in identifying information, namely that they have the fundamental right to
formulate their identity. 180 However, legislators have repeatedly determined that the best interests of the adoptee must be weighed against
the interests of the natural parents, the adoptive parents, and the
state.' 8' Mutual consent legislation resembles confidential records statutes as it considers the privacy interest of the natural parents before

172. See Sorosky, Baran & Pannor, supra note 42, at 198.
173. See Mills, 148 N.J. Super. at 307-09, 372 A.2d at 649.
174. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
175. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.40 (Page Supp. 1985).
176. See Lajoie, supra note 54, at 109-10.
177. See Mills, 148 N.J. Super. at 307, 372 A.2d at 649 (the child is ultimately the most
important party to the adoption).
178. See Roger B., 84 Ill. 2d at 327, 418 N.E.2d at 756; Mills, 148 N.J. Super. at 312-13,
372 A.2d at 649-50.
179. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.41(A)(I) (Page Supp. 1985) (twenty-one years of age
or older).
180. See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text. The United States Supreme Court,
however, has yet to recognize this fundamental right. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying
text.
181. See Roger B., 84 III. 2d 323, 418 N.E.2d 756 (1981) (the legislature balanced the
interests of the child, the natural parents, and the adopting parents).
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any identifying information is released. Nevertheless, although H. 84
tilts the balance in favor of natural parents by giving them the opportunity to decide whether to consent to the release of identifying information, the new law considers the needs of adoptees by providing for a
wide degree of access to nonidentifying information. 182
The new law expands the descriptions required of both social and
medical histories. 8 3 It also allows the adopted person to inspect such
information upon request, as well as notifying him or her of any corrections or expansions. 84 By allowing adopted persons a wide degree of
access to nonidentifying information, the Ohio General Assembly
should be commended. Under confidential records statutes, adoptees
have traditionally sought access to their adoption records based on
medical reasons and the right to know their identity. Because H. 84
allows access to nonidentifying information rather freely, the new mutual consent registry legislation may help to resolve the access to adoption records controversy.
V.

CONCLUSION

In an effort to resolve the recent controversy relating to the accessibility of adoption records, the Ohio General Assembly passed House
Bill 84 (H. 84).18 5 H. 84 establishes a mutual consent registry, thus
abandoning the state's confidential records statute. The mutual consent
registry establishes a new mechanism for the release of information to
an adopted person that would likely assist the person in identifying his
or her name by birth, the identity of biological parents, and the identity
of any biological siblings.
Mutual consent registry legislation, such as H. 84, represents the
current trend among state legislatures seeking a compromise between
open records and confidential records statutory schemes. The recent
success of mutual consent registry laws is largely attributable to the
questioning of many of the arguments held in support of confidential
records, namely, the protection of the natural mother and encouraging
adoption over abortion. Moreover, convincing arguments can be made
that mutual consent registry laws protect both of these concerns.
H. 84 abandons the good cause standard required under-confidential records statutes in an apparent attempt to weigh the interests of

182. See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.17(D) (Page Supp. 1985). For a discussion on
access to nonidentifying information, see supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
183. See OHio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3107.12(C)(3), (D)(3), 3107.17(D), (E)(I) (Page
Supp. 1985).
184. See id.
185. Act of November 20, 1984, 1984 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-643 (Baldwin) (codified in scattered sections of chs. I, 13, 21, 31, 37, and 51 Omo REV. CODE ANN. (Page Supp. 1985)).
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the adopted person against the other parties to the adoption process-the natural parents, the adoptive parents, and the state. The new
law establishes the requirement of mutual consent, which mandates
that the natural parents first authorize the release of identifying information before any such information will be released. A close examination of the mutual consent scheme reveals that the new requirement
closely resembles that of good cause, in that it reflects the interests of
the other parties to the adoption process.
The primary interest protected under H. 84, in terms of releasing
identifying information, is the natural parents' right to privacy. By allowing the natural parents wide discretion in determining whether to
authorize the release of identifying information, the mutual consent
registry favors the natural parents' right to privacy over the adopted
person's right to know his or her identity.
However, not all adopted persons seek access to their adoption
records for the purpose of obtaining information regarding the identity
of their natural parents. Many adopted persons desire nonidentifying
information, such as medical, ethnic, or hereditary histories of the natural parents. Despite the fact that control over the release of adoption
records lies within the discretion of the natural parents, H. 84 allows
the adopted person wider access to nonidentifying information than
under prior Ohio law. Therefore, the mutual consent registry appears
to be a workable resolution of the access to adoption records controversy.
Lawrence J. Spegar
Code Sections Affected: To amend sections 149.43, 1347.08, 2101.16,
2101.24, 3107.12, 3107.14, 3107.17, 3705.18, and 5103.15; to enact
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